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FAILURE TO ADVISE NON-CITIZENS OF IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
SHOULD THIS BE GROUNDS TO WITHDRAW A
GUILTY PLEA?
JohnJ. Francis* **
In this Article, Professor Francis argues that non-citizen criminal defendants
should be afforded greater latitude in withdrawing guilty pleas, when those pleas
are made without awareness of potential immigration consequences. Moreover, the
Article highlights the roles both judges and attorneys should play in ensuring that
non-citizens do not enter into such uninformed pleas.
Noting that courts have characterized deportation as a collateral consequence of a
criminal conviction, the article argues that deportation, following the passage of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1996, is unique in its severity and
certainty. Many of the same due process considerations which underpin the re-
quirement of advisement of direct consequences apply equally as strongly in the
case of the collateral consequence of deportation; therefore, the Article argues, these
policy considerations require that courts advise criminal defendants that if they are
not citizens of the United States, entering a guilty plea may adversely impact their
ability to stay in this country.
The Article proposes that bar associations develop universal standards requiring
attorneys to determine the immigration status of all clients and to properly advise
non-citizen clients of deportation risks of convictions. Further, failure to comply
with these minimum standards should constitute the basis of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim. Finally, the Article calls on Congress and state legislatures
to amend criminal procedural rules to require that all criminal defendants be ad-
vised that if they are not United States citizens, entering a plea of guilty or no
contest to crimes may adversely impact their immigration status.
A man enters a courtroom in which a criminal docket is being
called. The man is there to answer a complaint charging various
offenses stemming from an alleged domestic violence incident.
When the man's case is called, the judge notes that the man is not
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; Director,
Washburn Law Clinic; B.A. 1985, Lafayette College; J.D. 1989, The American University,
Washington College of Law. Professor Francis began his career with the NewYork City Legal
Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division as a trial attorney.
** I thank my colleague, Professor William Rich, Washburn University School of Law,
for his insightful comments. I also thank my research assistants, Tamarenid Santiago-Gonzales
and Susan Richards for their diligent work. Additionally, I commend the efforts of the
Washburn Law Clinic interns, Keith Whiteford, Rebecca Hestand, Jack Kaplan and Teri Can-
field-Eye who researched, drafted and argued the Muriithi brief to the Kansas Supreme Court.
Finally, I thank my wife Irene and son Punleu for their encouragement and inspiration.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
represented by counsel. As is done in courts throughout the coun-
try, the judge appoints an attorney who is present in the courtroom
and passes the case to later in the day so that the new attorney and
client can discuss a plea arrangement that the prosecution has of-
fered. Before passing the case, the judge notes that the defendant
speaks with a foreign accent and asks where the man is from.
"Kenya," the man responds.
After the man and his new attorney speak for a few minutes
about the plea offer, the case is recalled. The man accepts the
prosecutor's proposal, agreeing to plead "no contest" to one count
of Domestic Battery,' and one count of Endangering a Child.2 Both
offenses are misdemeanors. In exchange for the plea, the prosecu-
tor agrees to dismiss the remaining counts and to recommend a
probationary sentence with no jail. On the record, the court enters
the defendant's plea and sentences him in accordance with the
prosecutor's recommendation.
Over one year later, the man, who had entered the United States
on a student visa, is placed in deportation proceedings and held in
custody by the INS. Under immigration laws passed in 1996,3 the
offenses to which the man pled no contest render him deportable.4
He remains in immigration detention, fighting deportation for a
period longer than the maximum jail penalty of the offenses for
which he was convicted. He fights to stay because he has a son born
in this country.
Even though the court that accepted the man's pleas one year
earlier established that he is from another country, neither the
court nor the man's attorney informed him that entering these
pleas could adversely impact his ability to stay in the United States
if he was not a citizen. The man moves to withdraw his no contest
pleas, stating that had he known he could be deported, he would
not have entered the no contest pleas. The trial court denies the
motion. Upon appellate review, relief is denied. The state's high
court rules that deportation is merely a "collateral consequence" of
a criminal conviction.' Under these circumstances, neither the
man's attorney nor the court was required to inform him that these
1. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3412a (2002).
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608 (2002).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952), amended in 1996 by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA), see infra note 7, and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, (AEDPA), see
infra note 8.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (2) (E) (i) (2000). Under this section of IIRIRA, conviction for
domestic battery is a deportable offense.
5. See State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002).
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pleas could have immigration consequences. The man is eventually
deported to Kenya.'
INTRODUCTION
Since passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 7 and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)," non-citizens who are
convicted of criminal offenses, sometimes relatively minor in
nature, often find themselves subject to deportation. For non-
citizens, deportation is often a more serious consequence than the
maximum statutory penalty of a criminal offense. 9 However, all too
often, non-citizen defendants are not advised of possible
immigration consequences prior to entering a plea of guilty or "no
contest" to a crime.'l In most jurisdictions, neither the court nor
defense counsel is required to inform non-citizen criminal
defendants that conviction for many crimes can lead to
deportation proceedings." Without knowing all the consequences
of a guilty plea, it is difficult for a defendant to make an informed
decision of whether to fight a case at trial or to plead guilty. Plea
offers that initially appear attractive, requiring no incarceration,
can lead to deportation and extended exclusion from the United
6. This scenario is based upon the facts of Muriithi. While these facts are derived from
a particular case, similar situations regularly unfold in criminal courts across the country;
The author of this Article was the supervising attorney for the Washburn Law Clinic interns
who wrote the brief on Muriithi and argued the case on behalf of Muriithi before the Kansas
Supreme Court.
7. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
9. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Galvan v. Press, opined that deporta-
tion may "deprive a man 'of all that makes life worth living,'" 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954)
(quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). Deportation can separate an
individual from his or her home and family, leave a family without the primary income
earner, cause financial crisis, exact an emotional toll on the family unit, and sometimes
permanently separate persons from their loved ones. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the
Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv.
1936, 1951 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Daniel J. Murphy, Comment, Guilty Pleas and the Hidden Minefield of Immi-
gration Consequences for Alien Defendants: Achieving a 'Just Result" by Adjusting Maine's Rule 11
Procedure, 54 ME. L. REv. 157, 158 (2002).
11. See infra notes 105-06, 198-99 and accompanying text.
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States. This raises the question of whether pleas taken under such
circumstances are knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
1 2
Jurisdictions are divided on how to address this issue. Currently,
eighteen states and the District of Columbia require that prior to
entering guilty pleas, either the court or defense counsel must ad-
vise alien defendants that the ensuing convictions may impact their
immigration status. 13 More than half the population of the United
States resides in these nineteen jurisdictions. However, to date no
federal circuit has ruled that failure to advise a non-citizen of po-
tential deportation is grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea. ' The
main reason for denying such relief is that deportation is a collat-
16
eral rather than a direct consequence of a criminal conviction.
Historically, collateral consequences do not provide a basis to over-
turn guilty pleas. 7 While deportation and exclusion from the
12. Before a court can accept a defendant's plea of guilty, the defendant must know-
ingly and voluntarily waive his rights on the record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5
(1969).
13. States requiring the trial judge to warn a criminal defendant of possible immigra-
tion consequences include: California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 1985); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j (2001); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-713 (2001);
Florida, FLA. R. CRIM. P. Rule 3.172; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93 (Supp. 2002); Ha-
waii, HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802E-2 (Michie 1999); Maryland, MD. RULE 4-242 (2003);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278 § 29D (2002); Minnesota, MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01;
Montana, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-12-210 (2001); New Mexico, N.M. CR. FoRM 9-406 (2000);
New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 220.50 (McKinney 2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1022 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (Anderson 2002); Oregon, OR.
REv. STAT. § 135.385 (2001); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-12-22 (2000); Texas, TEx.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.13 (2003); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.40.200 (West
2002); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.08 (West 1998). States holding that trial counsel must
advise clients of deportation consequences include: California, see In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171
(Cal. 2001), People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), People v.
Guzman, 172 Cal. Rptr. 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Colorado, see People v. Pozo, 746 P.2ct 523,
527-529 (Colo. 1987); Florida, see Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Oregon, see Lyons v. Pearce, 676 P.2d 905, 909 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
14. In 2000, the population of the nineteen jurisdictions totaled 150,422,308 people.
That constituted 53.45% of the United States' total population of 281,421,906. U.S. Census
Bureau, Annual Population Estimates by State, available at http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/
states/tables/ST-EST2002-01.php (last revised Dec. 27, 2002).
15. See infra note 106 and accompanying text; see infta note 198 and accompanying text.
16. The Supreme Court has consistently held that deportation is a civil penalty rather
than criminal punishment. E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
17. Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1977) (a defendant needs to be ad-
vised of the direct consequences of his plea but he need not be informed of all collateral
consequences); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1005 (1973) (failure to inform of separate civil proceedings against defendant for
commitment to a mental health facility does not render a plea invalid); Hutchison v. United
States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (failure to advise that plea will result
in loss of good time credit does not render plea invalid); United States v. Vermeulen, 436
F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971) (omitting discussion on the re-
cord about possibly imposing consecutive sentences did not render the plea defective);
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United States may not fit the technical definition of a direct conse-
quence of a conviction,' IIRIRA and AEDPA render deportation a
near certainty for convictions of a broad class of offenses.' '
Practice and training manuals used by the criminal defense bar
consistently advise of the necessity to inform non-citizen clients of
potential immigration problems that may result from convictions. °
However, practitioners do not universally heed that message. The
United States Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,2 ' noted that com-
petent defense counsel will advise clients of relevant provisions of
immigration law that may be impacted by plea agreements. 22 Nev-
ertheless, most courts will not consider failure to do so ineffective
assistance of counsel.22 Consequently, such an omission by an
alien's attorney will not be grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea
that leads to deportation proceedings.
To address these problems, Part One of this Article examines
how current immigration law impacts non-citizens facing criminal
charges. Analyzing the history and evolution of immigration policy
leading up to IIRIRA as well as post-September 11 th considerations
places this discussion in context. Part Two of this Article analyzes
the policy behind current criminal procedures requiring the court
and defense counsel to advise defendants of the direct conse-
quences of guilty pleas. Although courts have not held that
deportation fits the technical definition of a direct consequence,25
this Article observes that many of the same policy reasons requir-
ing warnings of direct consequences also exist for immigration
consequences stemming from convictions. The Article proposes
that these shared policy underpinnings require that courts advise
criminal defendants that if they are not citizens of the United
Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916
(1965) (court's failure to advise that a conviction would result in deprivation of rights to
vote and to travel abroad did not make plea invalid); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d
Cir. 1963) (failure to inform of loss of the right to vote did not render the plea unknowing).
18. A direct consequence has a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on
the range of the defendant's punishment." United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965
(9th Cir. 2000). See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
19. Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The SentencingJudge as Immigration judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1136-37 nn.19-23 (2002); see discussion infra pp. 701-05.
20. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2000) (discussing how "competent
defense counsel" rely on "numerous practice guides" when advising clients of immigration
consequences).
21. Id.
22. See supra note 20.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
24. See infra notes 198-99.
25. Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that deporta-
tion is not directly part of the sentence for the criminal offense).
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States, entering the plea may adversely impact their ability to stay
in this country.
Part Three of this Article considers the standards of competent
advice and representation in the criminal defense community.
Recognizing that the United States is historically a nation of immi-
grants,26 changes in the economy have brought many non-citizen
residents to portions of the country not traditionally considered
ports of entry.27 Consequently, defense attorneys unaccustomed to
representing foreign-born clients are increasingly confronted with
advising non-citizens of the benefits and detriments of plea offers.
As such, the defense community must develop more consistent
standards of practice requiring attorneys to advise alien clients of
potential immigration consequences stemming from guilty pleas.
Moreover, this Article urges courts to recognize that a lawyer's fail-
ure to conform to these standards constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel, permitting withdrawal of the plea. At a time when im-
migration authorities are more aggressively enforcing even minor
infractions of immigration requirements, 28 it is particularly impor-
tant for attorneys to conform to vigilant and standard practices in
this area.
26. Louis DeSipio & Rodolfo 0. de la Garza, MAKING AMERICANS, REMAKING AMERICA
15 (1998).
27. See infra notes 223-25. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 1999
STATISTICAL Y.B. OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICES, 1999, 162 tbl.41
(2002), available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/
FY99yearbook.pdf. For example, in 1999, 48,242 immigrants were admitted to Kansas "for a
specified purpose and temporary period but not for permanent residence." U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., STATISTICAL Y.B. OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, 1997, 101 (1999), available at http://ww,.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/
aboutus/statistics/19974B.pdf. Compare this to the 34,293 non-citizens admitted to Kansas
during fiscal year 1996 on a non-permanent basis. Id. at 132.
28. For example, the INS recentlyjailed six Middle Eastern students studying in Colo-
rado because they were enrolled in too few credits. One of the students was just one hour
tinder a full load. Under enrollment is a technical violation of student visas. None of the stu-
dents is suspected of any other offense. Cable News Network, Non-U.S. Students Jailed Over Class
Load, (Dec. 27, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.coin/2002/EDUCATION/12/27/
foreign.students.ap/index.html. According to the director of International Programs at Colo-
rado State University, most of these students had legitimate reasons for carrying a lighter credit
load. Cable News Network, University Plans Workshop After INS Arrests, (Dec. 29, 2002), available
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/EDUCATION/12/29/ins.student.arrests.ap/index.html.
Note that in 2003, the INS was reorganized into two agencies under the authority of the
Department of Homeland security. The two agencies, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immi-
grations Services (BCIS) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE),
have recently been re-named. They are respectively known as U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See http://
uscis.gov/graphics/index.htm and http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index.htm.
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1. IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION LAW ON NON-CITIZENS
CONVICTED OF CRIMES
A. History and Evolution of lIRIRA and AEDPA
An evolution in immigration law, resulting in current IIRIRA and
AEDPA legislation, was driven by Congress' concern over an in-
crease in the number of non-citizens entering the nation's prisons.
Movement in the direction of IIRIRA began in 1985 at the behest of
New York Senator Alphonse D'Amato, who asked the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate INS handling of "criminal
aliens" in the New York City area. Attempts to address the per-
ceived problem initially focused on improving the efficiency of the
INS operations." For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 di-
rected the INS to "begin any deportation proceeding [against a
criminal alien] as expeditiously as possible after the date of the con-
viction. -
Congressional attention to the issue continued for the next two
years, when Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida organized hearings to
investigate INS procedures for removing aliens who have engaged in
criminal conduct., The hearings spotlighted problems that the INS
29. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1944, citingH.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 118 (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.; 142 CONG. Rsc. H2361 (1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon); 142
CONG. REc. S3347 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
30. Peter H. Schnck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of
Federalism, 22 HARY.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 425 (1999). The General Accounting Office (GAO)
reported that the INS failed to deport most of the aliens who were arrested on felony charges.
Id. (citing U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., CRIMINAL ALIENS: INS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS IN THE NEW
YORK CITY AREA 2, 31 (1986)). Moreover, the report stated that the INS failed to prevent re-
entry into the U.S. of those few it did remove. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., CRIMINAL
ALIENS: MAJORITY DEPORTED FROM THE NEW YORK CITY AREA NOT LISTED IN INS's INFORMA-
TION SYSTEMS 8 (1987)). During 1986, the media spotlighted the inability of INS to adapt to
the rising number of aliens charged with crimes. Id. Pointing to reports, Senator D'Amato
opined that criminal aliens were "'savaging our society."' Id. at 426. He cited a report docu-
menting that over a fifteen-month period, over 12,000 non-citizens had been arrested for
felony charges in New York City, yet only 304 had been deported during 1985. Id(citing UPI,
Mar. 23, 1986).
31. The INS issued a written plan, the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP),
which contained a strategy for the next decade. The report recognized a need to improve
methods of identifying, apprehending, and detaining non-citizens charged with crimes. The
plan included a proposal for coordinating efforts with local law enforcement agencies. The
plan also recognized that the INS did not at that time have the resources to implement the
plan it had outlined. Id. at 427-28.
32. Id. at 429 (quoting IRCA § 701 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (i) (1994))).
33. Id. at 430 (citing Illegal Alien Felons. A Federal Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Federal Spending Budget, and Accounting of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 2
(1987) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles)).
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encountered in their removal system.4 These deficiencies were
magnified by the INS' attempts to implement two new programs
under the umbrella of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) . One of these two programs penalized employers who
hired undocumented employees."6 This was designed to reduce jobs
available to illegal immigrants, thereby reducing a draw for illegal
immigration.37 The second program implemented an amnesty plan
for millions of aliens who were illegally in the country. 3 However,
allocation of INS assets to these programs siphoned resources away
from deportation efforts.
Frustrated by persistent INS inefficiency, Congress turned its at-
tention from improving Service efficiency to diminishing the
procedural rights of non-citizens charged with criminal offenses."
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 introduced the classification of
"aggravated felon" for non-citizens charged with certain offenses.41
Once convicted of an offense classified as an aggravated felony, non-
citizens had fewer forms of relief available in deportation proce-
dures.42 Moreover, non-citizens falling into this category were
presumed to be deportable, were not eligible for voluntary depar-
ture, and were not allowed to return to the United States for ten
years after their removal.43 Implementation of this Act was the first
significant step toward curtailing the options of aliens convicted of
crimes.
Steps were taken on other fronts to limit options that had long
been available to convicted non-citizens fighting deportation. Since
1917, judges in criminal courts who sentenced aliens for deportable
"crimes of moral turpitude" possessed statutory power to
recommend against their removal from the country.4 These 'judicial
34. The hearings revealed problems with identifying aliens who had committed crimes.
These problems were due to poor coordination between the INS and local law enforcement,
inadequate INS detention facilities, computer system incompatibilities between the INS and
the FBI and resource shortages. See id.
35. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
36. Schuck&Williams, supranote 30, at 431 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a, 1324b).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 433.
41. Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988 § 7347(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a), 1252(a)
(1994).
42. Schuck & Williams, supra note 30, at 434, 434 n.327 (citing ADAA of 1988 § 7347(c),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a), 1252(a) (1994)).
43. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 §§ 7343(b), (c), 7349, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a),
1182(a)(17), 1252(a) (1994).
44. Former 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (1988) read in pertinent part:
[VOL. 36:4
Consequences of Cnminal Convictions
recommendations against deportation" (JRADs) were binding on the
INS, preventing them from using that particular conviction as the
basis for deportation proceedings.4 However, in 1990, Congress took
this power away from sentencing judges.4" This move characterized a
policy shift away from evaluation of deportation cases based upon the
facts and circumstances unique to each case in favor of a one-size-fits-
all classification.47 With this stroke of the legislative pen, a powerful
means for non-citizens to have mitigating circumstances evaluated in
481deportation decisions was taken away.
The provisions of subsection (a) (4) [which addressed crimes of moral turpitude] re-
specting the deportation of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply
(2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crimes shall make, at the time of first im-
posing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a
recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported....
45. Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that theJRAD provi-
sion of 8 U.S.C. 1251(b)(2) granted "the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide
whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation"). See Taylor &
Wright, supra note 19 (arguing that sentencing jtudges in most criminal cases should also make
the deportation decision since, among other reasons, they have access to the facts and circum-
stances of the criminal act).
46. Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505(b), 104 Stat. 5050. Although the
Crime Control Bill that became part of the Immigration Act of 1990 originally contemplated
preserving a limited version of JRAD power, which would have merely preventedJRADs from
protecting aggravated felons against deportation, as amended, the Act eliminatedJRADs alto-
gether. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 111990). See Taylor & Wright, supra note 19 at 1150 n.72.
47. The elimination of JRADs parallels the retreat away from judicial discretion in favor
of the mandatory criteria imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Reformers
who lobbied for establishment of the sentencing guidelines sought to rid the sentencing proc-
ess of judicial discretion and "other presumed sources of sentencing disparity." Kate Stith &
Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 28 WAKE FoREST L. Rv. 223, 231 (1993). Discretion in sentencing has recently been
further reduced with enactment of the so called "Feeny Amendment." Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L.
No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). Enacted on April 30, 2003, the Feeny Amendment, which was
added onto the "Amber Alert Bill," reduces the already limited circumstances in which federal
judges may depart downward from the sentencing guidelines. Douglas A. Kelley, FederalJudge
Draws Congressional Ire, 60 BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 25 (July, 2003). The amendment prohibits
downw-rd departures predicated upon "youth, physical impairment, gambling dependency,
aberrant behavior, family ties and responsibilities, military service and good works, and dimin-
ished capacity." Id. Moreover, under the amendment, the chief judge of each district must
report departures to the Guidelines Commission and the attorney general must report down-
ward departures to the Judiciary committees of the House and Senate. Id.
48. Based upon this author's personal experience as an attorney with the NYC Legal Aid
Society, Criminal Defense Division,JRADs were commonly sought for clients who might other-
wise rnn afoul of immigration laws based upon a criminal conviction. Legal Aid attorneys were
trained to seekJRADs when a conviction might give rise to immigration problems for a client.
SUMMER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Notwithstanding these aggressive steps, the perception persisted
that aliens who committed crimes presented a significant problem to
our society.49 During the ensuing years, the number of non-citizens
entering our penal system continued to rise.5 This increase fueled
ongoing congressional concern, demonstrated by several Congres-
sional reports. 1
While the number of foreign-born persons entering the prison
system did indeed rise, the numbers of those incarcerated from the
general population also increased dramatically. Between 1972 and
1997, incarceration rates across the country rose five times over.2 The
number of non-citizens in prison rose along with many other
demographic groups.3 Nevertheless, this increase, along with the
ominous shadow caused by the 1993 terror attack on the World
Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of a federal building in
Oklahoma City,54 motivated Congress to make the sweeping changes
heralded by IIRIRA .
Exercising the JRAD power permitted sentencing judges, who were in a position to evaluate
whether circumstances of a case merited relief from potential deportation, to make that deci-
sion.
49. Schuck & Williams, supra note 30, at 445 (citing Wilson Wants U.S. to Help State Support
Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Nov. 21, 1991, at A9) (discussing attempts by the Califor-
nia governor to obtain federal assistance with expenses related to immigrants, including
incarceration of criminal non-citizens); Albany Sues U.S. on Aliens Held in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1992, at BI (reporting on a lawsuit instituted by New York against the Justice Department
for failure of the INS to take custody of non-citizens released from prison); Lynn Neary, Immi-
grant Services Burden California Economy (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 26, 1992); Eric
Lichtblau & KevinJohnson, O.C. to Study Cost of Services to Immigrants, LA. Times, Oct. 16, 1992,
at Al.
50. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1944 n.49.
51. See Morawetz, supra note 9. See also Schuck & Williams, supra note 30, at 446 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 103-645, at 4 (1994) (discussing House investigation findings of inefficiency in
the process of removing deportable non-citizens).
52. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1944 n.49.
53. Congressional attention focused on the apparent increase in the number of foreign-
born people incarcerated in federal prisons. Id. Indeed, in September, 1998 people born out-
side the United States made up 29% of the federal prison population while constituting only
9.3% of the general population. Id. However, this number is somewhat misleading unless
viewed in the context of state prison populations. Foreign born residents made up only 7.6% of
the state prison population. Id. When the 1998 statistics for the state and federal prisons popu-
lations are combined, foreign-born inmates made up 9.3% of the combined populations. Id.
This is the same number as their percentage of the general population. Id.
54. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The
Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 15 (2002); Although the per-
petrator of the Oklahoma City attack was an American citizen, early theories opined that the
attack had been carried out by someone who was not an American citizen. Indeed, early specu-
lation theorized that the bomber(s) had Middle Eastern origin. Bryan Sierra, Congress Reacts to
Oklahoma Bombing, UPI, Apr. 20, 1995, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting on an inter-
view given by Senator James Inhofe, of Oklahoma, to NBC's "Today" show in which he stated
there was a likelihood the bomb originated with a Middle Eastern organization and that he
favored retaliation against any nation found to have sponsored the terroristic act.).
55. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
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B. IIRIRA and AEDPA Impose Harsh Consequences on
Non-Citizens Who are Convicted of Crimes
Prior to enactment of IIRIRA, deportation procedures applica-
ble to permanent resident aliens convicted of criminal offenses
typically operated in two stages. At the first stage, an immigration
judge determined whether the person was deportable. If so, the
deportable non-citizen could seek relief from deportation based
upon her individual facts and circumstances. 6 Since enactment of
IIRIRA, many more people are presumed deportable in the first
step. Meanwhile, relief previously available in the second stage has
been all but eliminated. 7
A significant reason more people are deportable in the first step
is attributable to the change in the definition of "aggravated fel-
ony."5 8 A major factor in determining whether an offense qualifies
as an "aggravated felony" is the duration of the prison sentence.
5 9
The 1996 changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
reduced the qualifying time period from a minimum five-year
prison sentence down to one year.60 Indeed, even a one year sus-
pended sentence can meet this threshold. Consequently, offenses
classified as misdemeanors or violations in state penal codes can be
classified as aggravated felonies under the INA.
62
Not only do crimes with shorter sentences now qualify as aggra-
vated felonies, but the category of offenses falling under this new
definition has expanded. For example, money laundering and tax
56. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1938-39. See, In re Marin, 16 I. & N., Dec. 581, 584
(B.I.A. Aug. 4, 1978) (describing a procedure at which the non-citizen appellant first con-
ceded deportability, but then applied for relief from deportation under 212(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. This determination was made by balancing the "alien's
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented
in his behalf to determine whether the granting of section 212(c) relief appears in the best
interests of this country.").
57. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1939. See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2000) (discuss-
ing the impact of IIRIRA's elimination of relief under section 212(c)).
58. See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (1994) (amended 1996) (defining "aggravated felony");
see also Melinda Smith, Comment, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Noncitizen Clients: Understand-
ing Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law & How Recent Changes in Those Laws May Affect Your
Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163, 199-201 (1999).
59. See infra notes 60-61.
60. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §101(a)(43)(F)-(G), 8 U.S.C.
§ll01(a)(4)3(F)-(G) (Supp. II 1996) and INA §101(a)(43)(F)-(G), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (43) (F)-(G) (1994) (amended 1996).
61. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1939.
62. Id.; see United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Saenz-Mendoza, 287 F.3d 1011 (10th
Cir. 2002). But see United States v. Ponce-Casalez, 212 E Supp. 2d 42 (D.R.I. 2002).
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evasion of amounts as low as $10,000, now qualify as aggravated
felonies." The qualifying amounts for these offenses were reduced
from $100,000 and $200,000, respectively. 4 Crimes of violence, in-
cluding simple assault, for which imprisonment of one year or
more is imposed, qualify as aggravated felonies. Crimes of theft,
including petit larceny, for which imprisonment of one year or
more is imposed, also qualify under the new definition for aggra-
vated felonies." Most drug offenses now meet the definition, as
well.61 Once a non-citizen is saddled with an "aggravated felony"
conviction, she is not eligible for "cancellation of removal" or dis-
cretionary relief from deportation. "8 The classification essentially
makes an individual per se deportable.
Notably, after a non-citizen has been convicted of a deportable
offense, even after completing an incarceratory sentence for the
crime, the individual can permissibly be held in custody pending
deportation. The U.S. Supreme Court approved this practice in
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43)(M) (1994) (amended 1996).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) (Supp. II. 1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (1994)
(amended 1996).
65. INA §101(a)(43); 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (1994)
(amended 1996). A case that drew national media attention, that of Mary Ann Gehris, illus-
trates this point. Ms. Gehris was adopted from Germany when she was fifteen months old. Her
parents did not naturalize her. At the age of 23, Ms. Gehris received a conviction for an inci-
dent in which she pulled another woman's hair. She received a suspended sentence of one
year. Years later, due to retroactive crime classifications created by the 1996 immigration laws,
Ms. Gehris, who is married, has a child with cerebral palsy, and no ties to her country of birth,
faced deportation to Germany. See Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 CAL. L. REv. 741, 741-43 (2001); Brad Dixon, GA State in
the News, available at http://www.gsu.edu/information/general-announce/msg00631.html. Ms.
Gehris' eleven-year-old criminal case, although a misdemeanor under the Georgia Penal code,
retroactively qualified as an aggravated felony since it was technically a crime of violence with
a sentence of at least one year. This not only made her deportable, but also barred her from
relief from deportation. Id.; Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1943. See infra notes 89-90 and ac-
companying text for discussion of the problems created by retroactive application of new
immigration laws.
66. INA § 101 (a) (43); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994) (amended 1996). Indeed, even
offenses traditionally considered minor in nature can render a person deportable. Such
offenses include shoplifting, subway turnstilejumping, and possession of small personal-use
amounts of drugs. Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of
the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN
DIF.Go L. REV. 855, 870 (1998).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (B) (2000). See, e.g., Melinda Smith, supra note 58, at 203
n.222 (noting that with the exception of personal use marijuana cases involving 30 grams or
less, a conviction for any controlled substance charge will result in deportation even if it falls
outside the definition of "aggravated felony").
68. See INA § 240A(a) (3) (eliminates "cancellation of removal" for aliens convicted of
an aggravated felony); IIRIRA § 304(b), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009-597 (1996)
(repealing INA § 212(c)), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) (1994) (repealing the authority of the Attorney
General to grant discretionary relief to lawful permanent residents who become excludable
from the country).
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its recent decision of Demore v. Kim."") The most significant aspect
of the Kim decision was that the Attorney General would be per-
mitted to detain a convicted non-citizen pending removal without
any individualized finding regarding risk of flight or danger to
the community. 7' The Court justified this position by observing
that "[i] n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens.,
7
'
The escalating nature of immigration consequences was under-
scored by the Supreme Court when it stated that "'any policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contempo-
raneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the
war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of govern-
ment.' ,,7 The Court clearly indicated that in waging the War on
Terror, the government may amend policies regarding the manner
in which non-citizens are treated. The irony of the Kim case is that
the respondent, Hyung Joon Kim, was not from a country that is a
focus of the War on Terror. Rather, Kim is a South Korean national
who entered the United States in 1984 at the age of six. Kim be-
came a lawful permanent resident two years after entering this
country. In 1996, Kim was convicted of first-degree burglary in
California state court. One year later, he was convicted of petty
theft.74 The combination of these two offense rendered Kim de-
portable. Kim sought release on bond pending adjudication of the
removal proceedings.7 ' This claim was rejected by the Supreme
Court, which reasoned that even though he was a legal permanent
resident, under section 1226(c) Kim was not entitled to have his
individual circumstances evaluated in determining whether he was
69. 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003).
70. Id. at 1720.
71. Id. at 1716 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
72. Id. (citing 426 U.S. at 81 n.17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
588-89 (1952))).
73. Id. at 1712. Kim did not maintain ties to Korea, nor is he sufficiently fluent in the
Korean language to secure gainful employment if he is ultimately deported there. Charles
Lane, High Court Upholds Immigrants' Custody, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at A2.
74. 123 S. Ct. at 1712.
75. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted
Kim's Habeas Corpus petition, ordering the INS to conduct a prompt individualized bond
hearing based upon risk of flight and danger to the community. After doing so, the INS
released Kim on $5,000 bond. Id. at 1713. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the District Court decision, rejecting the notion that mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) is justified to ensure that aliens show up for removal proceedings and to protect
the public. Id.
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a flight risk or a danger to the community.76 Interestingly, the INS
did not argue that detaining Kim was necessary to ensure he ap-
peared for removal.77 This decision illustrates yet another potential
pitfall to non-citizens who are convicted of crimes.
Recent immigrants to the United States are at particular risk. A
non-citizen who commits a "crime of moral turpitude" for which a
sentence of one year could be imposed, faces mandatory deporta-
• 781
tion. While under some circumstances, relief from deportation is
available after accruing seven continuous years in the country, any
deportable offense occurring within seven years of entry stops the
clock for purposes of calculating continuous residency.79 Since
there is no statute of limitations on deportation proceedings, indi-
viduals acquiring such convictions during their first years in the
country are subject to deportation for the rest of their lives.0
A troubling aspect of the 1996 INA provisions is that operative
definitions of terms used in criminal courts do not necessarily
apply in the immigration context. As observed, the term
"aggravated felony" can have one meaning under a state's penal
code and have an entirely different meaning under the INA.
Another critical example is the definition of "conviction." In some
states, a Youthful Offender adjudication is not considered to be a
• • 81
conviction. Many states have diversion provisions in their criminal
procedure codes which permit defendants to resolve cases without
obtaining a conviction on their records.82 However, interpretations
76. "Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of
that process." Id. at 1721-22.
77. Id. at 1727 (SouterJ., dissenting).
78. SeeINA§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1996); Morawetz,
supra note 9, at n.34 (observing that a person falling tinder this provision will not be eligible
for relief because they will not have accumulated the necessary seven years to qualify for
such relief. Moreover, prior to 1996, a single conviction for a crime of moral turpitude did
not render an individual deportable unless the sentence actually imposed was at least one
year of incarceration). Significantly, even a suspended sentence can render an individtal
deportable. For example, a Cambodian refugee who arrived in the United States as a teen-
ager, Sokhom Oeur, used a weapon to defend himself when threatened by a group of young
men. He was ultimately convicted of assault. Even though he received a suspended sentence,
he faced deportation. Kathleen O'Rourke, Deportability, Detention and Due Process: An Analysis
of Recent Tenth Circuit Decisions in Immigration Law, 79 DEN. U. L. REv. 353, 355 (2002) (cit-
ing Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law's New Aggravated
Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 589 (1998)).
79. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1941.
80. Id. at 1942. Morawetz observes that under these provisions, young people who im-
migrate with their families and get into minor trouble that is not uncommon for teens can
be rendered deportable. Offenses such a petit larceny will be sufficient to cause deportation.
This can result in permanent separation from family.
81. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 720.10 (McKinney 2002).
82. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2909 (2002).
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of IIRIRA can deem both of these types of dispositions to be
convictions.0-
C. The Impact of the USA PATPlOTAct
Recent legislation passed in response to the tragic terror attacks
of September 11, 2001 further expand the list of offenses that can
result in deportation and exclusion from the United States. The
USA PATRIOT Act, an acronym for "Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism,"84 renders excludable any person who has
engaged in or is engaging in any offense relating to money
laundering. 5 The USA Patriot Act contains provisions that facilitate
the removal of non-citizens with criminal histories through
technological improvements in the exchange of information
between law enforcement agencies and immigration authorities.
Specifically, Section 403 authorizes the State Department and
immigration authorities to obtain access to the FBI's National
Crime Information Center's Interstate Identification Index for the
purpose of screening immigration applicants. ; Other provisions
also assist identifying removable aliens from the United States.87
The War on Terror may yield legislation that further curtails the
ability of non-citizens who are convicted of crimes to remain in this
country.88
83. Under IIRIRA, a conviction includes "a formal judgment of guilt of the alien en-
tered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where ... (i) ajudge orjury
has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has
admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some
form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed." INA
§ 101 (a) (48) (A). See McDermid, supra note 65, at 772.
84. Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. (codified as amendments to various
sections of U.S.C.).
85. INA § 212(a)(2)(I). Indeed, any person whom a consular officer or the Attorney
General knows or has reason to believe will engage in such an offense is excludable. Id.
86. Austin T. Fragomen,Jr. & Steven C. Bell, Removal of Aliens, in 1340 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, 35TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 289, 291 (Practising
Law Institute ed., 2002).
87. Id. at 292. The Act directs the Attorney General to implement an entry and exit
data system, to attempt to use biometric technology in doing so, to develop tamper-resistant
immigration documents, and to ensure that this system can interface with law enforcement
databases. Id. Additionally, the foreign student monitoring program must be expanded to
include vocational schools, language training schools and flight schools, rather than only
higher education institutions. Id.
88. On February 7, 2003, the PBS news program, NOW with Bill Moyers, broke a story
about a draft version of legislation created by the Justice Department designed to follow up
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As alluded to earlier, another critical feature of amendments to
the INA is that many of the new classifications apply retroactively to
offenses committed prior to the amendment.9 This development
makes immigration law a moving target for non-citizen criminal
defendants and for their attorneys. Even those attorneys who re-
searched deportation consequences for their clients and advised
them accordingly may find out years later that well-reasoned deci-
sions at the time of entering a plea to criminal charges did not
protect their clients from removal. This raises the question of
on the USA PATRIOT Act. See Report of Roberta Baskin, NOW with Bill Moyers (PBS televi-
sion broadcast, February 7, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript206_
full.html. The proposal, known as the "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003" (also
known as "PATRIOT ACT II") would purportedly eliminate removal hearings for non-
citizens convicted of a deportable offense. See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003
§ 504, available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-low.pdf. Currently, such expe-
dited removal can be imposed only on non-permanent aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies. See IIRIRA § 308(b) (5). The proposal would expand this construct to all aliens,
without distinguishing between permanent resident aliens and non-permanent aliens. Addi-
tionally, it increases the list of offenses qualifying for expedited removal. Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003 § 504. The reasoning provided in the draft is that "once an alien
has been convicted of a criminal offense, any additional administrative process is unneces-
sary: a court has already found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alien has committed
the acts which render him removable." Id. The proposal goes on to state that there is no
reason to distinguish procedures for permanent resident aliens and non-permanent since
the class of offenses ultimately renders both removable. Id. If enacted, this legislation would
amplify the need to advise non-citizens of the immigration consequences flowing from
criminal convictions. Under such a construct, deportation for certain offenses would no
longer be virtually automatic-it would be actually automatic.
89. INA § 101 (a) (43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(43) (Supp. 11 1996) (enacted by IRRIRA,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(b), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 30009-546, 3009-628); see
Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 97, 154-55 nn.260-61 (1998) (noting that although the 1996 amendments apply
retroactively, they do not apply to offenses occurring before the 1988 creation of the term
"aggravated felony"). Nevertheless, Morawetz points out that most non-citizen aggravated
felons are deportable on other grounds and consequently barred from relief under IIRIRA.
Id. at 155 n.261.
90. An example of the potentially disastrous consequences of retroactivity upon an
immigrant who had made a life in this country occurred in the case of Jesus Collado.
Morawetz, supra note 89, at 115-17. Mr. Collado entered this country in 1972 as a teenager.
While still a teenager, he engaged in a sexual relationship with his girlfriend, a minor four
years his junior. Collado entered into an agreement in which he pled guilty to sexual abuse
in the second degree but received no incarceration. At the time he entered his plea, this
conviction did not lead to deportation. He would only have been deportable for this crime
of moral turpitude if he had served one year of incarceration. Over the next two decades,
Collado married, had children and managed a restaurant. In 1997, when returning from a
visit to the Dominican Republic, he was placed in deportation proceedings. The retroactivity
of IIRIRA rendered his sole criminal conviction, which occurred while he was a teen, a de-
portable offense. Id. (citing Mirta Ojito, Old Crime Returns to Haunt an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1997, at BI). After Collado received an adverse ruling from the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, the INS ultimately changed its position, resulting in dismissal of the case. See
Siskind's Immigration Bulletin, Collado Case Dismissed by Court (Aug. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.visalaw.com/98sep/19sep98.html. While this case was ultimately dismissed, it
highlights the possibility that non-citizens may enter into pleas that effectively navigate
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what a criminal defense attorney needs to know to competently
represent a non-citizen client charged with a crime. This also raises
the questions of whether an alien defendant who enters a guilty
plea without knowing the immigration consequences does so
knowingly and voluntarily. Indeed, can any immigrant enter a plea
knowingly and voluntarily when she cannot know whether future
legislation affecting that plea will apply retroactively?
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REQUIRES THAT PLEAS
BE ENTERED KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
The founding principles of the American justice system provide
that no person shall be deprived of certain rights or privileges
without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment states,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . . ."' To this end, it is a well settled
matter of criminal procedure that pleas of guilty entered in crimi-
nal cases must be knowing and voluntary. The landmark case of
Boykin v. Alabama92 held that in order for a plea to meet constitu-
tional standards, the record must demonstrate that "the defendant
voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea[] .'9 The defen-
dant must make the decision to plead guilty with knowledge of the
"relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of that plea.9 4 This is
satisfied by an inquiry demonstrating that the "defendant under-
stands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts
sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the
permissible range of sentences. '9 5 Indeed, this concept is so impor-
tant that it has been codified into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11, which reads in pertinent part:
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty ... , the court must
address the defendant personally in open court ... the court
must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defen-
dant understands, the following: ... the nature of each
charge to which the defendant is pleading; any maximum
around immigration consequences, only to have retroactive application of I1RIRA render
the offenses deportable.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
93. Id. at 244.
94. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (emphasis added).
95. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7.
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possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of
supervised release; any mandatory minimum penalty; any ap-
plicable forfeiture; the court's authority to order restitution;
the court's obligation to impose a special assessment; the
court's obligation to apply the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
court's discretion to depart from those guidelines under some
circumstances; and the terms of any plea-agreement provision
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sen-
tence.6
Rule 11 requires the court to "conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea."97 One of the "core
concerns" underlying this rule is that defendants "know and un-
derstand the consequences of his guilty plea."98 If the court fails to
address one of the "core concerns," then the plea is invalid." Look-
ing at the specifics embodied in Rule 11, it is clear that importance
is placed on individuals understanding the possible consequences
of their pleas prior to foregoing the ability to fight the accusations
through the trial process.' °° Recent amendments to these advisories
cover more than just potential incarceration. They also cover pos-
sible forfeiture, restitution and assessments.'0 ' Possessing
information about consequences stemming from the conviction
will clearly guide the decision of whether or not to waive the Sixth
Amendment right to trial.0 2 The recent amendments to Rule 11
reflect concern over issues beyond merely terms of incarceration
and parole.
96. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1). Note that in the 2002 amendments, the Committee ex-
panded on the list to include "advice as to the maximum or minimum term of
imprisonment, forfeiture, fine, and special assessment, in addition to the two types of
maximum and minimum penalties presently enumerated: restitution and supervised re-
lease." FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 advisory committee's note.
97. United States v. Siegel, 102 F.3d 477, 481 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.
Stitzer, 785 E2d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir. 1986)).
98. Id. (citing United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508, 511 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991)). Two
of the other core concerns are: "(1) the guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the de-
fendant must understand the nature of the charges." Id.
99. Stitzer, 785 F.2d at 1513.
100. United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (informing the defendant
that the maximum sentence was 60 years, when in actuality, it was 30, was not harmless. Pos-
sessing incorrect information as to the actual sentence rendered the waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial unintelligent and therefore invalid. Had the defendant known he
was actually facing half of what he was informed, it might have changed his decision to enter
a plea of guilty.).
101. See supra note 96.
102. See supra note 100.
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A. Direct and Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction
The criminal justice system clearly recognizes the necessity that
people be informed of direct consequences likely to result from a
conviction.' °3 As such, it seems paradoxical that there is no univer-
sal belief that non-citizens must be informed of the immigration
consequences stemming from their pleas. Under IIRIRA, a host of
deportation consequences to guilty pleas are certain and almost
automatic. 0 4 Nevertheless, Rule 11 places no obligation on judges
to determine whether defendants are aware of potential immigra-
tion penalties of convictions.10 5 Such an admonition is omitted
under the reasoning that the immigration consequence is not ac-
tually punishment imposed by the criminal court and that it is
therefore collateral in nature. 0 6 Courts have also proposed that
since there are so many potential collateral consequences to guilty
pleas, requiring such admonitions would work a hardship on the
court. "The collateral consequences flowing from a plea of guilty
are so manifold that any rule requiring a district judge to advise a
defendant of such a consequence as [deportation] would impose
an unmanageable burden on the trial judge.'0 7
103. See supra note 96.
104. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. Under IIRIRA, the INS has no
discretion to grant relief from deportation for certain crimes.
105. FED, R. CRIM. P. 11; see also Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976)
(stating that Rule 11 does not require the court to inform a defendant about immigration
consequences of a plea because deportation is "not the sentence of the court which ac-
cepted the plea but of another agency over which the trial judge has no control and for
which he has no responsibility.") (quoting Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir.
1974)).
106. See United States v. E-Nobani, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[I]t is clear that
deportation is not within the control and responsibility of the district court, and hence,
deportation is collateral to a conviction.") (citing United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d
177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[Wle hold that potential deportation is a collateral consequence
of a guilty plea.")); United States v. Quin, 836 E2d 654, 655 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[D]eportation
... is generally regarded as a collateral consequence."); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d
764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[D]eportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.");
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("It [is] well settled ... that Rule 11
does not require informing a defendant of the possibility of deportation."). Relying on this
reasoning, the EI-Nobani court concluded that lack of awareness of deportation conse-
quences resulting from a guilty plea does not render the plea "unknowing or involuntary."
EI-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421. See also, U.S. v. Amador-Leal 276 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating
that Rule 11 does not require the court to inform defendants of immigration consequences
because they are collateral to the conviction).
107. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976).
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The rationale behind such a position is that the defendant need
only be aware of direct consequences of a plea.'0 "Direct conse-
quences" have been defined as consequences that have a
"'definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of
the defendant's punishment.' """' There is no constitutional obliga-
tion to inform a "defendant of all the possible collateral
consequences of the plea."""0 However, for the broad class of of-
fenses encompassed by the post IIRIRA definition of "aggravated
felony," one can hardly term deportation as a speculative possibil-
ity. It is a near certainty. Notwithstanding the fact that the
deportation procedure can cause an individual to experience con-
ditions as damaging to one's life as most serious criminal
sentences, the federal court system holds to a view that deporta-
tion's collateral nature is settled due to the fact that a court other
than the sentencing court imposes the sanction. The certainty and
severity of deportation are trumped by this circumstance.
Supporting this view is the fact that deportation proceedings are
traditionally held to be civil proceedings. In 1893, the United
States Supreme Court noted:
[Deportation] is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a
crime or offence ... The order of deportation is not a pun-
ishment for a crime ... It is but a method of enforcing the
return to his own country of an alien who has not complied
with the conditions upon the performance of which the gov-
ernment of the nation, acting within its constitutional
authority ... has determined that his continuing to reside
here shall depend."'
108. SeeKingv. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151,153 (6th Cir. 1994).
109. United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000); Torrey v. Estelle, 842
F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The distinction between a direct and collateral consequence
of a plea "'turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely auto-
matic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.'") (citing George v. Black, 732
F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d
1364, 1366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973))); see also United States v. Lambros,
544 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 1976).
110. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151,153 (6th Cir. 1994).
111. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). See also Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that ex post facto prohibitions do not apply to
deportation legislation because it is not punishment for a crime but rather a civil penalty).
However, note that the dissent in Fong Yue Tingstated:
[l]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is
punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family,
and friends, and business, and property; and sent across the ocean to a distant land,
is punishment; and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.
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Nevertheless, the technical distinction between collateral and
direct consequences ignores the punitive nature of the conse-
quence. 2 There have been some occasional attempts to reassess
this approach, however, the prevailing view remains that deporta-
tion proceedings stemming from convictions are collateral to the
criminal proceeding.' 
3
B. Past Treatment of Immigration Consequences Bore
Characteristics of Direct Consequences
Further characteristics exist demonstrating that immigration
consequences are not truly collateral to criminal proceedings. In
addition to the punitive and direct nature of deportation caused by
conviction, Congress has, in the past, vested criminal judges with
power over deportation by establishing the JRAD. Extending the
power to prevent deportation to criminal judges seems at odds with
the notion that deportation is a civil penalty."4 The manner in
which JRADs were determined amplifies this point. Granting this
relief did not generally turn upon matters of immigration law. In-
stead, it focused on facts of the case, the defendant's criminal
record, and family and community ties. 15 Whether a JRAD was
granted was generally discussed as a sentencing matter by the
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (BrewerJ., dissenting).
112. A novel argument has been made that, under the reasoning stated in Fong Yue
Ting, even imprisonment does not qualify as a direct consequence. It is argued that the
proceeding to determine incarceration "is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a
crime or offense." Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of
the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 307-308, n.7
(2000) (citing STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 45 (2d
ed. 1997)). The argument also criticizes the Fong Yue Ting court's characterization of depor-
tation as "merely removing individuals who are undesirable." Id. This depiction fails to
explain how deportation is not punishment since the purpose of punishment in the crimi-
nal context is "the separation of an undesirable person from society." Pauw, supra note 112,
at 308 n.7 (citing STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THEJUDICIARY: LAW AND POLI-
TICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICAN 208-09 (1987)).
113. See e.g. Pauw, supra note 112, at 308-09 nn.8-10. It is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court has held that some civil sanctions can be considered punishment. United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, a defendant was convicted of submitting
false claims for medical expense reimbursement totaling $585. In a related civil proceeding,
he was assessed a civil fine of $130,000. The Supreme Court held that the disproportionate
nature of the fine to the amount of the false claim rendered it punitive. Id.
114. SeeTaylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1145.
115. Id. In this author's personal experience, discussions with the court when seeking
JRADs focused exclusively on facts of the case and circumstances of the defendant's life.
Intricacies of immigration law were not part of the discussion.
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judge and the attorneys."" The view that aJRAD is a component of
sentencing obtained judicial support. In Janvier v. United States, the
Second Circuit ruled that the JRAD determination "is part of the
sentencing process, a critical stage of the prosecution to which the
Sixth Amendment safeguards are applicable. " '7 In reaching this
conclusion, the Janvier court examined the legislative history of the
JRAD." s This examination revealed that the 1917 Congress consid-
ered deportation to be punishment for a crime." 9 Consequently,
the sentencing judge should have the power "to make the total
penalty for the crime less harsh and less severe when deportation
would appear to be unjust."'120 Thus, Congress, to which the courts
have repeatedly deferred on immigration matters, 2 ' has consid-
ered deportation commenced as a result of a guilty plea to be a
sentencing matter. If it was a sentencing matter, it was not collat-
eral to the conviction.
The United States Justice Department has also engaged in prac-
tices which seem inconsistent with the view that deportation is
totally separate from criminal proceedings. Former Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno, in a 1995 memo, encouraged federal prosecutors
to make deportation issues part of the plea bargaining process, of-
fering more lenient sentences in exchange for stipulations not to
contest deportation. 22 In fact, the Reno Memo encouraged federal
prosecutors to seek removal in all cases involving deportable aliens,
not just those involving deportable crimes. When incorporated
into a negotiated agreement, the non-citizen defendant would ac-
cept the deportation order at the time of sentencing after the
court confirmed alienage, deportability, and waiver of the right to
a hearing before an immigration judge and judicial review of the
116. Id.
117. 793 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at453.
119. Id. at 453-55.
120. Id. at 453 (citing 53 CONG. REc. 5169-74); Taylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1146.
121. Pauw, supra note 112, at 311 (stating that "under the traditional view, legislative
control over immigration matters is plenary"); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711, 713 (1893)
("The power to exclude or expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is
vested in the political departments of the government."); Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89
(1952) ("policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the politi-
cal branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.").
122. Taylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1160.
123. Id. at 1163 n.127 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RES. MANUAL § 1921
(2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading_room/usam/title9/
crm01921 .htm [hereinafter Reno Memo] ).
[VOL. 36:4
SUMMER 2003] Consequences of Criminal Convictions 713
deportation order. 24 Deportation conditions were often written
into supervised release orders issued as part of the sentence. 25 Af-
ter completion of the criminal sentence, the INS executed the
order. 21 In exchange for consenting to deportation, prosecutors
characteristically recommended downward departures of one or
two offense levels from that prescribed by the sentencing guideline
for the offense.2 7 By engaging in this policy, the U.S. Attorneys Of-
fice made immigration consequences of criminal convictions part
and parcel of the criminal court process. Although federal prose-
cutors no longer follow this policy, 128 this past practice strains the
view that deportation is collateral to a criminal conviction.
Notwithstanding judicial interpretation that deportation is col-
lateral to criminal proceedings, the judiciary has issued opinions
inconsistent with this notion. One such ruling occurred in the con-
text of deciding whether judicial deportation 29 determined during
sentencing proceedings was eligible for attorney's fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act. 30 In denying eligibility, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that since judicial deportation was a criminal
proceeding, it did not qualify for fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act.'
13
From a pragmatic and historical view, there is ample evidence
that deportation is not collateral to a criminal conviction, but
rather a direct and certain consequence of it. Some have argued
that conclusions to the contrary are "really a judicially-created
124. Taylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1163.
125. Id. at 1164.
126. Id. at 1163-64.
127. Id. at 1164.
128. Due to the increasing ease with which the INS can effect deportation of aliens with
convictions, prosecutors no longer feel it is advantageous to the government to negotiate
more lenient sentences in exchange for stipulated deportation. Consequently, they seek
deportation during plea negotiations far less frequently. A 1997 memo to the U.S. Attorneys
noted that the 1996 amendments to the removal process "reduce[] the benefit the Govern-
ment derives from an alien's ... stipulation to removal." Id. at 1166. It admonishes
prosecutors not to offer downward departures "unless the Government receives an
articulable benefit." Id. at 1166 n.136 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE RES. MANUAL § 1999
(2000), available at http://ww.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/asam/title9/
crm01999.htm).
129. District Court judges have the power "to order deportation as part of the criminal
sentencing proceeding ... 'a United States district court shall have jurisdiction to enter a
judicial order of removal at the time of sentencing.' 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1) (previously 8
U.S.C. § 1252a(d)(1))." United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).
130. The Equal Access to Justice Act entitles a party who has prevailed against the gov-
ernment in a civil action to receive an award for attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A).
131. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018.
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myth.' 32 As such, there is every reason to require courts to provide
advisories about potential immigration consequences prior to ac-
cepting guilty pleas. Many of the same policy considerations
requiring warnings for traditionally direct consequences also exist
for immigration consequences.
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE POLICIES REQUIRING ADVISORIES
FOR SENTENCING ALSO EXIST FOR IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
With one of the core concerns of the Rule 11 advisories being
that defendants know and understand the consequences of their
guilty pleas, 33 it is apparent that direct or not, deportation is a con-
sequence of such magnitude that it profoundly impacts the rest of
the non-citizen defendant's life. In the dissent in Fong Yue Ting,
Justice Brewer quoted President Madison saying,
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he
has been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his
happiness,-a country where he may have formed the most
tender connections; where he may have invested his entire
property, and acquired property of the real and permanent, as
well as the movable and temporary, kind; where he enjoys,
under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal
security and personal liberty than he can elsewhere hope for;
... if, moreover, in the execution of the sentence against him,
he is to be exposed, ... possibly to vindictive purposes, which
his immigration itself may have provoked,-if a banishment of
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of
punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which
the name can be applied.
34
132. Taylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1174. Taylor and Wright advocate a new ap-
proach to deportation proceedings that would, in most cases consolidate the immigration
and sentencing proceedings. "It is a time to rethink the fundamentals-including the no-
tion that deportation is a civil sanction that should be separated from the criminal sentence
imposed on noncitizen offenders." Id. at 1169.
133. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
134. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (quoting 4 Elliot's Debs. 555 (statement
of President Madison)). With this statement, President Madison not only observes the truly
punitive nature of deportation, he also identifies the extreme manner in which it affects the
life of an immigrant to this country.
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The Second Circuit described deportation as "a sanction in se-
verity [which] surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal
penalties.' ' 13 5 Indeed, some trial courts recognize "that deportation
consequences are often of far greater concern for legal aliens than
any prison sentence they might receive.' 3 6
Loss of liberty stemming from a conviction is clearly a concern
addressed by constitutional protections17 and the Rule 11 advise-
ments. Under IIRIRA, non-citizens can remain in pre-deportation
detention for protracted periods of time while fighting removal. 3
They can also be held in detention while waiting for a removal or-
der to be executed. 139 Most often, this pre-deportation detention
occurs in jails that detain people held on criminal charges. 40 Once
the deportation is carried out, although no longer incarcerated in
the traditional sense, a very real loss of liberty continues. If liberty
is defined as freedom to move about without restriction, removal
from this country certainly eliminates one's liberty.14' The exclusion
135. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977).
136. United States v. El-Nobani, 145 F. Supp. 2d 906, 914 (N.D. Ohio 2001), rev'd, 287
F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law..."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII ("[E]xcessive fines [shall not be] imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person ... the equal protection
of the laws.").
138. See Schuck & Williams, supra note 30, at 462 (discussing the INS's current policy of
contracting for local jail space). See also8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a) (1) (2003).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (2) (2003).
140. See supra note 138. See also Wesley L. Hsu, The Tragedy of the Golden Venture: Politics
Trump the Administrative Procedures Act and the Rule of Law, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 317 (1996). A
notorious example of using local jails to detain individuals awaiting INS litigation involves
the asylum seekers from the Golden Venture. In 1993, over 220 Chinese nationals made a
perilous journey on a rusty freighter, the Golden Venture, seeking refuge in the United States.
The ship ran aground just off of Queens, NY The passengers, many of whom jumped ship
and tried to swim for shore, were detained by the INS. They were held for three years and
eight months in various local detention facilities before finally being ordered released. Most
of these facilities also housed people charged with and/or convicted of crimes. After release,
ninety-nine of the refugees returned to China. The balance took various paths, including
being sent to Latin America, obtaining asylum in the United States, and obtaining artists'
visas. Some are still awaiting asylum determinations. Id. See also Marvin H. Morse & Lucy M.
Moran, Troubling the Waters: Human Cargos, 33J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 26 (2002). See also Mae M.
Cheng, Ship s Passengers Struggle On, NEWSDAY,June 2, 2003, at A4.
141. Liberty is defined as: "Freedom; exemption from extraneous control." BLACKS'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (4th ed. 1951); Liberty is also defined: "n. the condition of being
free from restriction or control; the right to act, believe, or express oneself in a manner of
one's choosing... ." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 723 (2d College Ed. 1991). "The
right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,125 (1958).
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that ensues from a deportation order obviously prevents one from
freely or legally traveling back to the United States. Removal to
some countries may mean that the deportee will lose freedom in
the country of her birth. This may be due to religious or political
beliefs held by the deportee or inability to travel freely may be a
condition of that particular nation. In one view, the loss of liberty
from deportation may cut deeper than loss of liberty from incar-
ceration.
Losing liberty to incarceration is a core concern of Rule 11 when
applied to criminal proceedings. Losing liberty to deportation,
which often includes pre-deportation incarceration, has not been
deemed a core concern even though it is a direct result of a criminal
• • 143
conviction. The rationale distinguishing these two consequences is
litde more than a matter of semantics. With incarceration, it is at
least possible that family members may visit. However, in many cir-
cumstances, once a removal order has been executed, separation
from family is complete and permanent. In some circumstances,
family members of the person deported may not be able to visit the
country to which their loved one is removed.1 4 Deportation results
in separation from one's adopted society, from one's livelihood, but
perhaps the most dire consequence is separation from one's
family.'
45
American jurisprudence has long recognized the importance of
family. 46 Even immigration law recognizes the importance of
keeping families together.147 Most immigrant visas for lawful
142. The United Nations Refugee Protocol recognizes that some people will lose life or
liberty in their home countries due to political beliefs. See Kendall Coffey, The Due Process
Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy,
19YALE L. & POL'y REv. 303, 312 (2001) (citing Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
143. See Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that Rule 11
does not require the court to inform a defendant about immigration consequences of a
plea). Since Rule 11 has not been interpreted to require admonitions about possible immi-
gration consequences, inferentially, it is not deemed to be a core concern.
144. See Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1951 (stating that as a legal matter, family members
remaining behind who are citizens of the United States may not be able to immigrate to the
country to which the deportee was removed).
145. Id. at 1950-54 (discussing the devastating impact that the 1996 immigration laws
have on families). Due to the elimination of certain types of relief for those convicted of
aggravated felonies, most often, family members do not get the chance to plead the hard-
ship that they will encounter due to removal of their loved one. Id.
146. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that restrictions on the right
to marry violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding that parents may make decisions about the upbringing and education of
their children free of unreasonable state interference).
147. "[T]he preservation of the nuclear family.., should continue to be a cornerstone
of U.S. immigration policy." H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt.1, at 134 (1996) reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N.
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permanent residents are based upon familial relationships. 4s Yet
the 1996 immigration amendments impose a damaging impact on
many families, sometimes in a most cruel manner. There is a
particularly draconian impact on children who have been adopted
from overseas while very young to be raised in this country. Such
children, as they mature, usually know nothing of life in the
countries of their birth. They are often unfamiliar with the
language and customs of those lands. It is unlikely that they will
have any family, at least none they are aware of, in the countries in
which they were born. For every practical purpose, the countries
from which they were adopted are totally foreign lands to them.
Nevertheless, some individuals who have been raised as American
children have found themselves facing deportation for relatively
minor criminal offenses.1 4 There is little logic in deporting such
members of our society. Their personalities, cultural identities and
lives were established in the United States. Their criminal conduct
should be handled in the same manner as that of citizens.1 50 There
is no remedial objective achieved by banishing them from the only
home they have ever known.
1 51
Deportation resulting from criminal convictions is a conse-
quence of the nature addressed by Rule 11 advisements. A
148. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1950-51 (citing IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, Annual Report: Legal Immigration, Fiscal Year 1998, at 7 (1999)).
149. See supra note 65. John Gaul was adopted from Thailand at the age of three and
raised in Florida. His adoptive parents mistakenly thought the adoption made him an
American citizen. Gaul was convicted for his role in forging checks and stealing a car. After
completing twenty months incarceration, due to new deportation laws, he was deported to
Thailand. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1952.
150. Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1961 (quoting President's Comm'n on Immigration &
Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome 202 (1953). "Their formative years were spent in
the United States, which is the only home they have ever known. The countries of their
origin which they left-in two cases during infancy, in another, at the age of 5 years-
certainly are not responsible for their criminal ways.... If such a person offends against our
laws, he should be punished in the same manner as other citizens and residents of the
United States and should not be subject to banishment from this country." Id. The Commis-
sion recommended modifying deportation laws to preclude deportation based upon any
criminal conviction for anyone who lawfully entered the United States before the age of
sixteen or had lived in this country for twenty years).
It should be noted that with respect to children adopted from other countries, the Child
Citizenship Act has achieved some of these objectives. The Act provides that as of February
27, 2001 a child under the age of 18 years automatically acquires United States citizenship if:
(1) at least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, by birth or
naturalization, and (2) the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical
custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful entry for permanent residence. This Act
specifically applies to children adopted by United States citizens. The Child Citizenship Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, § 320, 114 Star. 1631 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1431).
151. One reason deportation is considered a civil, rather than criminal sanction is that
it is purportedly a remedial measure and not punishment. See Pauw, supra note 112, at 331.
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conviction resulting from a non-citizen's waiver of a trial without
an understanding of the resulting immigration consequences
would not seem to conform to the requirements of Boykin 52 and
Brady. 53 Nevertheless, amidst continuing challenges and criti-
cism, 5 4 federal appellate courts hold fast to the view that
deportation is merely a collateral consequence of a criminal con-
115viction. Accordingly, warnings about this consequence have not
thus far been required by due process or by Rule 11.15, States have
taken a mixed approach to this issue.1 5 7 Of the states that require
advisories, the vast majority have done so through legislative action
rather than a judicial determination that deportation is a direct
consequence of a conviction.' 5
The courts' continuing position that deportation is collateral to
criminal convictions fails to acknowledge that the 1996 amend-
ments to the INA make deportation a near certainty for non-
citizens convicted of certain crimes. '59 Controlling authority on this
point rests primarily upon case law generated prior to the enact-
ment of the 1996 amendments to the INA.160 Although some
jurisdictions have visited the collateral consequence issue since
1996, they have largely made only passing references to the impact
that IIRIRA and AEDPA have upon the certainty of deportation for
non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies. Significantly, these
jurisdictions continue to base their decisions on authority that de-
fined deportation as a collateral consequence before the 1996 INA
amendments.1 6 Such decisions provide the superficial appearance
152. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); see supra pp. 707-08.
153. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see supra pp. 707-08.
154. United States v. El-Nobani, 145 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ohio 2001) rev'd 287 F.3d
417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002). See also McDermid, supra note 65, at 762. See generally Scott A.
Kozlov, Deportation as a Collateral Consequence of a Guilty Plea: Why the Federal Precedent Should be
Reevaluated, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 895 (1992).
155. See infra note 161.
156. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 13.
158. See supra note 13.
159. See United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 E3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing how
IIRIRA and AEDPA make removal "virtually certain" for non-citizens convicted of aggravated
felonies); See also El-Nobani, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 911-912, (N.D. Ohio 2001) (discussing how
IIRIRA and AEDPA expand the class of offenses that render a non-citizen deportable and
how elimination of relief under § 212(c) of the INA makes deportation automatic for many
aliens convicted of crimes), revd, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).
160. See supra note 106, and infra note 198.
161. In United States v. Gonzalez, 202 E3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2000), the First Circuit rejected
the notion that the 1996 amendments to the INA had changed the relationship between
conviction and deportation in a manner that required revising the prior holdings determin-
ing the matter. Supporting its ongoing position that deportation is a collateral consequence
of a criminal conviction, the court cited to Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689, 692, (1st Cir.
1969), United States v. Russel4 686 E2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982), Cordero v. United States, 533
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of considering the drastic impact that IIRIRA and AEDPA have
upon non-citizens convicted of crimes without doing so in a mean-
ingful way.
It is clear that the judiciary is unwilling to budge from the posi-
tion that deportation is merely a collateral consequence simply
F.2d 723, 725 (1st Cir. 1976), Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976), Michel v.
United States, 507 E2d 461,465 (2d Cir. 1974), and United States v. Campbel4 788 F.2d 764, 766
(11 th Cir. 1985). All of these decisions relied upon by the First Circuit significantly predate
IIRIRA and AEDPA. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. EI-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421,
while acknowledging the automatic nature of deportation stemming from criminal convic-
tions in the wake of IIRIRA, held that deportation is still collateral to a conviction. In
reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on United States v. Gonzalez (which relied on
pre-1996 cases) and on several other cases from the 1980's. El-Nobani, 287 F.3d at 421 (citing
United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Quin, 836
F.2d 654, 655 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11 th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2002), purported to discuss whether AEDPA and
IIRIRA rendered deportation a direct consequence of a conviction. The court acknowl-
edged that removal for an aggravated felon is "virtually certain." Id. at 516. Nevertheless, it
relied, without modification, on its historic definition that advisories about immigration
consequences were not necessary because an agency other than the court carried it out. Id.
at 515-516 (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 E2d 946 (9th Cir. 1976); INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)). In so holding, these courts did not, in any meaning-
ftil way, contemplate the impact of IIRIRA and AEDPA on the collateral consequence
analysis. Instead, they superficially acknowledged it, but relied upon pre-1996 authority to
justify a perpetuation of the status quo. Id. But see United States v. Couto, 311 E3d 179, 190
(2d Cir. 2002) (noting that claims that AEDPA and IIRIRA have transformed removal into a
certain and automatic consequence of a conviction "deserves careful consideration, even
though three other circuits-the First, Sixth, and Ninth-have declined to reconsider their
prior holdings on this point." Nevertheless, the Couto court declined to consider the matter,
concluding that the issues presented in that appeal could be resolved without doing so.).
States analyzing whether immigration consequences are direct or collateral to criminal
convictions since the enactment of IIRIRA and AEDPA have largely followed suit. See
Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 405 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) ("Whether deportation is a
possibility or 'virtually automatic,' the underlying collateral nature of deportation does not
change: it remains an indirect consequence of a guilty plea." The reasoning employed
rested upon the pre-1996 case of Oyekoya v. State, 588 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).);
See also People v. Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Mich. 2000) (holding that deportation is
collateral to a defendant's convictions and is "unrelated to the trial court's inquiry."); State v.
Abdullahi, 607 N.W.2d 561, 567 (N.D. 2000) (stating immigration effects are collateral to a
criminal conviction, not because they arise "virtually by operation of law," but because they
are not imposed by "the court which accept[s] the plea but of another agency...." (quoting
Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976))); State v. Desir, 766 A.2d 374 (R.I.
2001) ("The possibility of deportation is only a collateral consequence [of a plea] because
that sanction is controlled by [another agency]." (quoting State v. Alejo, 655 A.2d 692, 692
(R.I. 1995))); Zigta v. Virginia, 562 S.E.2d 347, 350 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) ("Deportation is a
collateral consequence of the criminal conviction because it arises through the efforts of an
arm of government over which the trial court has no control ... " (citing United States v.
Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2002) (which itself relied upon pre-1996 authority);
United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000) (also resting on authority which
predated the 1996 INA amendments); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988)
(pre-IIRIRA decision, holding that deportation is a collateral consequence)).
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because the criminal court does not actually impose deportation.
Courts hold firm to this view even though removal is now an almost
certain consequence of certain criminal convictions 6 2 and is a most
severe consequence. Since attempts to convince courts that immi-
gration matters are properly classified as direct consequences have
so far been unsuccessful, perhaps advocates should give up trying
to move courts from this semantic trap and concede the label. In-
stead, advocates might concede that deportation technically fits the
narrow, currently-held definition of a collateral consequence.
However, they should then assert that due to the certainty and se-
riousness of the consequence, the Constitution, as interpreted by
Boykin and Brady, requires trial courts to give advisories about de-
portation consequences before accepting a guilty plea. Issuing
such advisories is the only way to ensure a knowing and voluntary
plea from a non-citizen. To do otherwise ignores reality in favor
of a technical word game, perpetuating an analytical construct that
is no longer adequate to evaluate immigration consequences of
criminal convictions.
There may be concern that this approach will open the flood-
gates to require advisories for all manner of collateral
consequences.CA However, this need not be. Among various collat-
eral consequences of convictions, deportation stands alone in its
detrimental impact, separating families, impeding liberty, and
eliminating much of what makes one's life precious. There is no
other collateral consequence that possesses the panoply of sanc-
tions accompanying deportation. Whether imposed by a criminal
court or a sure and certain consequence actually executed by an-
other authority, a defendant must be made aware of this
consequence by the trial court in order for a plea of guilty to be
truly knowing and voluntary.
162. See Morawetz, supra note 9, at 1940; EI-Nobani, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 913-914 (stating
that "deportation is often a direct and inevitable result of an alien defendant's conviction."),
rev'd, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).
163. See discussion of Boykin and Brady, supra Part II, pp. 707-08.
164. "The collateral consequences flowing from a plea of guilty are so manifold that any
rule requiring a district judge to advise a defendant of such a consequence as [deportation]
would impose an unimaginable burden on the trial judge...." Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531
F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976). Such other consequences include loss of good time credit,
deprivation of the right to vote and travel abroad, possible undesirable discharge from the
military, civil forfeiture, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess fire-
arms, loss of business license, professional license and driver license, among others. Gabriel
J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 705-706 (2002).
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IV. RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNSEL TO ADVISE
OF IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
While due process should require courts to warn non-citizen de-
fendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas, the court is
not the only avenue through which defendants receive information
about pleas. Defense attorneys have an independent responsibility
to non-citizen clients to inform them of immigration conse-
quences. This duty transcends that of the trial court. 
65
Nevertheless, non-citizens seeking to withdraw guilty pleas based
upon lack of advice of counsel have largely bumped into the "col-
lateral consequences" logjam as well. The majority of courts have
held that the collateral consequences doctrine extends to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
166
A. Standards for Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment entitles all criminal defendants to a trial
with the assistance of counsel.6 7 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this right to require that assistance of counsel be "effective. '
Effectiveaess is measured by the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington," which established a two-prong test to determine
whether counsel's actions rise to a level of incompetence such that it
violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The first prong
requires a demonstration that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. 7 ' The second prong requires a
showing of prejudice such that had counsel been effective, there
would have been a different outcome.171 The defendant has the
165. McDermid, supra note 65, at 754 (noting that it is the defense lawyer, not the judge
who must bring suppression motions). "Defense counsel is in a much better position to
ascertain the personal circumstances of his client so as to determine what indirect conse-
quences the guilty plea may trigger. Rule 11 ... was not intended to relieve counsel of his
responsibilities to his client." Id. (quoting Michel, 507 F.2d at 466).
166. See, e.g., McDermid, supra note 65, at 753 nn.69, 81.
167. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
168. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[I]f the right to counsel guar-
anteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies
of incompetent counsel.").
169. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
170. Id. at 687-88 ("The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply rea-
sonableness under prev-ailing professional norms.").
171. Id. at 687.
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burden of proving both prongs in order to set aside a plea of guilty
or no contest.1 7 2 In the context of guilty pleas, this second prong is
established by a showing "that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have instead insisted on going to trial."
73
With respect to the first prong, there is a "strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.' '7 4 However, critics have argued that the
standard by which ineffectiveness is measured "is itself ineffective,
allowing even the most egregious lawyering to pass muster." 75 The
Supreme Court has rejected adoption of detailed rules specifying
what constitutes reasonable performance under the first prong.176
It has, however, identified "[p]revailing norms of practice" as a
guide to what is reasonable. 77 These norms are "reflected in
American Bar Association standards and the like.' ' 7 8 Currently,
there are several-bar associations setting forth professional stan-
dards or the equivalent, practice manuals and training programs.
The American Bar Association (ABA) Defense Function
Standards, as described by the Supreme Court, establish general
standards for the function of defense counsel in criminal cases. As
a starting point, "[d]efense counsel should conduct a prompt
investigation of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction. ' ' 179 Clearly, this establishes a general norm that
attorneys make inquiries into the facts that may impact
consequences flowing from a possible conviction. However, the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice amplify on this point. "To the
extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the
defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the
contemplated plea."''8 Under the guidance from this standard,
even if an attorney did not consider removal a "penalty", counsel
would still be obligated to discuss immigration as a collateral
matter. To remove any ambiguity, the Comment for this
standard specifically addresses immigration issues, stating that
when a defendant faces deportation as a result of a conviction,
172. Id.
173. Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
174. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
175. McDermid, supra note 65, at 749.
176. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
177. Id. at 688.
178. Id. The Court stresses, however, that such standards are only a guide. Id.
179. ABA DEF. FUNCTION STANDARD § 4-4.1 (a) (1993).
180. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 14-3.2(f) (1997).
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defense counsel "should fully advise the defendant of these
consequences......
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also suggest that
competent representation requires an attorney to investigate
potential immigration consequences for their clients. 182 To comply
with this professional responsibility, some public defense agencies
conduct training and continuing education programs for their staff
attorneys to educate them about immigration consequences for
their clients. 8 3 For those not affiliated with a large public defense
office, continuing legal education programs are available on this
important aspect of defense practice. 8 4 Beyond such programs,
many practice manuals are available to defense practitioners.
l
185
One such practice manual, was cited by the United States Supreme
Court in INS v. St. Cyr ' in noting that "[p] reserving the client's
right to remain in the United States may be more important to the
client than any potential jail sentence.'8. The Supreme Court went
a step further, acknowledging in a footnote that "competent
defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides"
would advise clients of issues impacting immigration status.'88 While
this footnote has not been interpreted as setting a standard of
competence in this area, it is a tacit nod to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which require attorneys to attain competence
in the field of law being practiced through "necessary study" or
through "the association of a lawyer of established competence.
Recently, The Champion, a magazine published by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) ran a two part
series delving into immigration issues that arise when practicing
181. Id. at § 14-3.2, cmt. 75 (2d ed. 1982).
182. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1984).
183. This author's personal experience with the New York City Legal Aid Society,
Criminal Defense Division included training and continuing education regarding changes
in immigration law affecting non-citizens charged with crimes. See also Brief of Amici Curiae
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., 2000 U.S. Briefs 767 at 9, INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2000) (No. 00-767) (describing the training programs at the Legal Aid
Society, programs conducted by the California Bar Association, Criminal Law Section, and
training for federal defenders conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, among others).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 6-7 (listing as practice aids, Dan Kesselbrenner & Lory D. Rosenberg, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND CRIMES (West Group 1984-2000), Katherine A. Brady and David S.
Schwartz, PUBLIC DEFENDERS HANDBOOK ON IMMIGRATION LAW, among others). See also,
Taylor & Wright, supra note 19, at 1171 n.147, 1178 n.165.
186. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2000).
187. Id. at 322.
188. Id. at 323 n.50.
189. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1984).
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criminal defense law.'90 The article cites the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards, advising practitioners to "fully advise the defendant[s]
of [immigration] consequences.' 9' It warns of the importance to
determine the citizenship of every client, rather than assume
merely because a client speaks English without an accent or has a
surname that does not sound as though it is of foreign origin that
she is a United States citizen.'9 2 It goes on to warn practitioners that
it is "widely recognized as a violation of an attorney's professional
duty to her client not to advise her of the immigration conse-
quences of a plea or conviction.' ' 93 The article also provides
substantive information on immigration status, types of adverse
immigration actions, grounds for deportation and inadmissibility,
and specifics about aggravated felonies. With this and other readily
available resources, attorneys conforming to the professional stan-
dards of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have ample
information easily accessible to educate themselves on immigration
issues.
B. Courts' Views of Whether Attorneys Must Advise
of Immigration Consequences
Even though there are materials and programs readily available
to educate attorneys about the impact of immigration law on
criminal defense practice, and even though national organizations
have established standards of practice addressing this issue, na-
tionwide there remains a wide range of conduct that technically
complies with judicially enunciated standards for "effective coun-
sel."1 4 Courts generally approach this issue from one of three
perspectives. The first, and most widely held view, is that attorneys
are not required to address immigration consequences with their
clients at all.' 95 The second view is that although attorneys have no
affirmative duty to investigate and advise clients on such matters,
190. Tova Indritz, Puzzling Consequences of Criminal Immigration Cases, THE CHAMPION,
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 12. The mission of The Champion is stated to be: "to inform and educate
the membership and to improve communication within the criminal defense community."
Id. (masthead).
191. Id. at 13 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.2 cmt. 75 (2d ed.
1982)).
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Reno, 24 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd, 194
E3d 279 (lst Cir. 1999)).
194. See McDermid, supra note 65, at 750.
195. Id.
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they must not misinform their clients of immigration conse-
quences.9 6  The third view essentially adopts the standards
articulated by the ABA and other professional organizations, hold-
ing that criminal defense attorneys must affirmatively investigate
and advise clients of immigration consequences.197
Of the courts in the first group, relief is generally denied to de-
fendants whose attorneys have failed to advise them of deportation
risks based upon the rationale that removal is a collateral conse-
quence.198 By adopting the same reasoning courts apply to
themselves in Rule 11 type cases, courts fail to recognize that attor-
neys have a duty to their clients that transcends that of the court.'99
Sadly, this widely followed view holds attorneys to an unacceptably
low standard of practice that is inconsistent with the ABA standards
and runs contrary to the practices defined as the "professional duty"
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Quin,
836 F.2d 654, 655 (lst Cir. 1988); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. DeFreitas, 865 F2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that "[a]lthough,
ideally, counsel will inform the client of the possible consequences, failure to do so does not
rise here to a level of unreasonableness"); United States v. Banda, 1 E3d 354, 355 (5th Cir.
1993) ("We hold that an attorney's failure to advise a client that deportation is a possible
consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."); United
States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating "[wihile the Sixth Amendment
assures an accused of effective assistance of counsel in 'criminal prosecutions,' this assurance
does not extend to collateral aspects of the prosecution [such as deportation]") (emphasis in
original)); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1357 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that failure to advise
a client that deportation, a collateral consequence, may result from guilty plea does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768
(11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1990); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247,
252 (Alaska 1972) ("Superficially, there may appear to be an anomaly in holding both that
defense counsel has the burden of informing his client of collateral consequences and that
failure to inform of such consequences does not constitute denial of the effective assistance
of counsel. The appearance of anomaly results from the collateral character of the conse-
quence of deportation."); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that defense attorneys are not required to inform defendant of the collateral possibility of
deportation arising out of entry of plea); Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 31-32 (D.C.
1993); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 1987); Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322-23
(Md. App. 1985); State v. Chung, 510 A.2d 72, 76-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); State v.
Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 863-64 (N.D. 1994) (failure to advise of the effect of collateral
consequences does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v.
Frometta, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App.1994);
People v. Boodhoo, 191 A.D.2d 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); State v. Santos, 401 N.W.2d 856,
858 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
199. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the various approaches
taken by different courts, the Supreme Court has twice declined to address the issue of
whether a defense attorney has a duty to inform a non-citizen client of immigration conse-
quences. Rodrigues v. State, 572 N.E.2d 961 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992);
Varela v. Kaiser, 976 E2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1039 (1993).
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of defenders. °0 It effectively relieves attorneys of the responsibility
to address an issue that may be of the greatest interest to some cli-
ents.
201
The second group, prohibiting misinformation about immigra-
tion consequences, could be best characterized as a "don't ask-
don't tell" policy. Attorneys are under no affirmative obligation to
inform clients of immigration consequences, but if they do offer
advice, it must not mislead the defendant. 20 2 While this is an im-
provement on the first position in that it recognizes that the
attorney bears some responsibility, it is still inadequate. This sec-
ond position is flawed for two reasons.
First, as a matter of policy, this approach discourages attorneys
from offering advice on a matter of critical importance to many
clients. Imagine the following scenario. An attorney knows she is
not required, on her own initiative, to offer her non-citizen client
advice about deportation consequences of a potential criminal
conviction. While she wishes to advise her client on these issues,
she knows that if her advice turns out to be incorrect, her repre-
sentation may be deemed "ineffective." Such knowledge will
naturally create a chilling effect on the attorney's decision to offer
advice.
The second problem with this approach is that it places an af-
firmative duty to discern complex legal issues on a class of clients
least able to handle that duty. Clients rely on attorneys' expertise to
spot and address legal issues that arise during representation. This
logically includes consequences that flow from pleas. Insisting that
the defendant spot legal issues for the attorney turns the attorney-
client relationship on its head. This is particularly true for foreign-
born defendants. Requiring a class of defendants, who may have
the least amount of familiarity of all defendants with the American
legal system, to identify legal issues on behalf of the professional
on whom they are relying to do just that is an obfuscation of pro-
fessional duty.
2 °3
200. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a defendant who is told that deportation will not result from a plea may give
rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Corona-Maldonado, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 1171 (D. Kan. 1999); People v. Correa, 465 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
Morales v. State, 910 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
203. See Brief of Appellant at 18, State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002) (No. 01-
87213-A). See also McDermid, supra note 65, at 754 (asserting that requiring non-citizen
clients to raise the question to their attorneys creates disparate treatment for them com-
pared to citizen defendants and should be considered discrimination based upon alienage).
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The third group establishes a better standard of representation
for criminal defense attorneys. Under this view, attorneys have an
affirmative duty to offer advice about immigration consequences
flowing from criminal convictions. Nevertheless, within this group,
there is some variance concerning attorney's advisory responsibili-
ties. For example, California courts have established a high
standard, holding that even a generic warning to a non-citizen cli-
204ent is insufficient counsel. Under People v. Soriano, once an
attorney is aware of the alienage of her client, she has a duty to in-
vestigate how immigration law will bear upon the criminal case.
Failure to do so will render the attorney's conduct unreasonable
and will satisfy the first step of the Strickland test.2 0 5 In Oregon, that
state's high court determined that deportation is a "legal conse-
quence" of a guilty plea within the meaning of the state
constitution."6 While holding that the trial court was not required
to issue any specific advisory of these consequences the court in
Lyons v. Pearce held that defense counsel must. The court reasoned
that failure to do so deprived the defendant of effective assistance
of counsel and violated an Oregon statute governing the lawyer's
role in advising clients about criminal pleas.0 8
Within this third category, the Colorado courts accept a lesser
standard. The obligation to advise of immigration consequences is
conditioned upon the attorney's knowledge that the defendant is
not a citizen. The case of People v. Pozo held that when an attorney
"is aware that his client is an alien, he may reasonably be required
to investigate relevant immigration law. ,20' The standard of
204. People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, (Cal. App. 1987).
205. See id. at 335-336 (1987). ("Defendant received only a pro forma caution from his
attorney about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. Furthermore, whatever ad-
vice his counsel did give him was not founded on adequate investigation of federal
immigration law. Because he was not adequately advised of the immigration consequences
of his plea defendant has been prejudiced by the institution of deportation proceedings
against him. We conclude that defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in
entering his guilty plea and should be allowed to withdraw that plea.").
206. Lyons v. Pearce, 694 P.2d 969, 975 (Or. 1985).
207. Id. at 974 (interpreting OR. REV. STAT. § 135.385(2)[d] (1999) to mean that al-
though the trial court does not have to issue an oral admonition, it must be satisfied that the
defendant has been informed of potential immigration consequences of a plea).
208. Id. at 976 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 135.425 (1985)). The statute codified estab-
lished professional ethics regarding the role of defense attorneys when counseling about
plea options. However, failure to conform to this statute, by itself, was not sufficient to give
rise to relief. Relief was granted due to counsel's failure to provide constitutionally required
effective assistance. "One function a criminal defense attorney performs for a client is to
disclose the consequences of a guilty plea and conviction. For non-citizen defendants,
awareness of the possibility of deportation is necessary to an informed plea." Id. at 977.
209. 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987).
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knowing whether the client is an alien is evaluated by whether
there was "sufficient information to form a reasonable belief that
• • 210
the client" was not a citizen.
The shortcoming of limiting advice to instances in which attor-
neys know or should know whether the defendant is a non-citizen
is that the attorney should always know, except in instances in
which the client has supplied inaccurate information. Determining
citizenship of clients is not only a good practice for criminal de-
fense attorneys, it should be a required practice. As mentioned, on
occasion people who are presumed to be United States citizens are
not. The only reliable way to make this determination is for the
attorney to inquire. Given that criminal defense organizations
promote this practice,"' coupled with the magnitude of the conse-
quences that can arise from failure to ask into a client's
immigration status, failing to inquire is reckless.
Another shortcoming of this approach comes with application of
this standard on review. Courts applying this standard have found
that the attorney did not have reason to know the client's alienage
when the record demonstrates there was ample reason to
inquire . Additionally, relieving the attorney of the duty to inquire
about citizenship status once again presumes that a non-citizen
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. In People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr.
328, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), the court noted with approval the "Minimum Standards Prac-
tice" of Amicus Brief submitter, San Francisco Public Defender, which requires its staff
attorneys to ascertain "what the impact of the case may have on [the client's] immigration
status in this country." Id. (citing San Francisco Public Defender, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE). Additionally, when this author was trained at The New York City Legal Aid Soci-
ety, Criminal Defense Division the standard policy was to determine citizenship of every
client. See also Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 177 (E.D.N.Y 1997); Taylor & Wright, supra
note 19, at 1174 n.147, 1178 n.165.
212. See State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002). In Muriithi, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the record did not demonstrate that the defense attorney "knew or should
have known" that the defendant was an alien even though the judge ascertained in open
court that the defendant was from Kenya. Id. at 1151. However, the Kansas Supreme Court
was swayed by the fact that the defendant did not specifically mention citizenship. Although
the defense attorney was present in the courtroom when the defendant had this exchange
with the trial judge, the Kansas high court held "it may not be concluded from the record
that the courtroom exchange should have alerted defense counsel to make her own inquiry
about Muriithi's citizenship." Id. It is important to note that the Kansas Supreme Court's
written opinion states that although defense counsel was present in the courtroom, she was
not yet appointed to represent the defendant and had not necessarily heard the exchange.
Appellate counsel submitted a motion to correct the decision, arguing that the record
clearly demonstrated that defense counsel was appointed immediately before, not after, the
defendant's exchange with the court. See Appellant's Motion for Modification, State v.
Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002) (No. 01-87213-AS) (on file with the Kansas Supreme
Court). The court denied the motion without elaboration. See State v. Muriithi, No. 01-
87213-AS (Kan. Sup. Ct.July 11, 2002) (order denying rehearing or modification).
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client will have the savvy to appreciate the significance of the
criminal case upon his immigration status without being asked. 21
Opponents of mandating that attorneys inquire regarding the
immigration status of their clients argue that doing so requires un-
pleasant determinations as to what ethnic and stereotypical
attributes create reason to question alien status.2'4 The basis of this
argument is that it is repugnant to assume that one person may not
be a citizen while assuming that another is. This criticism is easily
deflected by requiring that attorneys determine the citizenship
status of all clients, as urged by the NACDL.2 ' In this manner, at-
torneys neither engage in repugnant generalizations nor do they
omit important advice by making incorrect assumptions.
C. Legislation Requiring Courts and Attorneys to
Inform of Immigration Consequences
While courts have been considering these issues, some state leg-
islatures have addressed the intersection of immigration law and
criminal procedure, enacting laws that either require a judge to
issue an advisory during the plea colloquy or require attorneys to
advise non-citizen client of deportation and exclusion conse-
216quences.6 California's Penal Code provides a good example of a
requirement that the judge admonish the defendant of immigra-
tion consequences:
§ 1016.5. Advisement concerning status as alien; reconsidera-
tion of plea; effect of noncompliance
(a) Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
to any offense punishable as a crime under state law, ex-
cept offenses designated as infractions under state law, the
court shall administer the following advisement on the re-
cord to the defendant: If you are not a citizen, you are
hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which
you have been charged may have the consequences of de-
portation, exclusion from admission to the United States,
213. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
214. See Brief of Appellee, State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002) (No. 01-87213-
AS).
215. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 13.
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or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the
United States.
(b) Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant addi-
tional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in
light of the advisement as described in this section. If, af-
ter [the effective date of the statute], the court fails to
advise the defendant as required by this section and the
defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which
defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have
the consequences for the defendant of deportation, ex-
clusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States,
the court, on defendant's motion, shall vacate the judg-
ment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.
Absent a record that the court provided the advisement
required by this section, the defendant shall be presumed
not to have received the required advisement.
217
Under this provision enacted in 1978, the court's failure to ad-
vise a defendant of potential immigration problems may permit
the defendant to withdraw the plea under certain circumstances.
Similarly, a Massachusetts statute requires the trial judge to issue a
comparable warning on the record when accepting the plea of a
non-citizen.1 If the court fails to do so, and the defendant "at any
time" shows that one of the enumerated immigration conse-
217. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 1985). But note that the court's failure to advise
gives rise to relief only if the defendant can demonstrate that he or she is not an American
citizen. People v. Suon, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Note also that subdivision
(d) of the California statute specifically states the trial judge should not ask the defendant to
disclose to the court whether he or she is legally in the country. Section 1016.5(d); See also
FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE 3.172(c) (8) (West 1999) (stating that the trial judge need not inquire
whether the defendant is a United States citizen but rather that this admonition be given to
all defendants); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.40.200 (West 2002) (stating "[iut is fur-
ther the intent of the legislature that at the time of the plea no defendant be required to
disclose his or her legal status to the court.").
218. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5; but see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 220.50(7) (McKinney
2002) (while New York criminal procedure requires the court to advise defendants of immi-
gration consequences, it specifically holds that failure to do so "shall not be deemed to
affect the voluntariness of a plea of guilty or the validity of a conviction, nor shall it afford a
defendant any rights in a subsequent proceeding relating to such defendant's deportation,
exclusion or denial of naturalization.").
219. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, N § 29D (2002).
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quences may occur, the court "shall" permit thedefendant to with-
draw the plea.20
Minnesota's Criminal Procedure Rules place a duty, first on the
defense attorney, to advise the defendant about potential immigra-
tion consequences of the conviction and then secondly on the
court to inquire of the defendant if her attorney has so informed
her:
221
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty, the defendant shall
be sworn and questioned by the court with the assistance of
counsel as to the following...
10. Whether defense counsel has told the defendant and the
defendant understands ...
c. That if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, a
plea of guilty to the crime charged may result in deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization as a United States citizen.
This rule has the benefit of ensuring that a defendant consults
with her attorney before entering a guilty plea. It also recognizes
that an attorney has a duty to her client on this issue.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH
While legislatures and courts have addressed this issue in a
sporadic manner, a consistent nationwide standard has eluded the
bar and the judiciary. Long before IIRIRA's enactment, some
jurisdictions developed practices urging that competent attorneys
counsel clients about potential immigration consequences of
convictions. This occurred largely in locations that have long had
sizable immigrant populations.223 However, there was less need for
220. Id. Unlike ineffective assistance claims, under this statute, the defendant need not
establish that had he or she knew of the consequences, he or she would not have entered
the guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 491 N.E.2d 601, 604 (1986).
221. MINN. RULE CRIM. PROC. 15.01 (2001).
222. Id.
223. For example, California, New York and Florida have long been considered ports of
entry for people immigrating to this country. Marvin H. Morse & Lucy L. Moran, Troubling
the Waters: Human Cargos, 33J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 4 (2002) (stating that since the earliest
days of immigration, newcomers arrived at Ellis Island, Boston, Baltimore, Savannah, Miami,
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such practices to develop in locations that were not historically
points of entry into the United States. 24 Representation of non-
citizens was not a common event for criminal defense attorneys in
such locations. Consequently, a consistent need to advise non-
citizens about how a conviction might impact immigration status
did not evolve.
Nevertheless, over the past decade, regions such as the Plains
States, which have not historically been points of entry for those
coming to the United States, have seen a marked increase in the
number of non-citizens joining their populations.2 2 5 Logically, as
New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle). These three jurisdictions
developed either professional practices or legal requirements that non-citizen defendants
receive adequate warnings. The San Francisco, California Public Defender has Minimum
Standards of Representation requiring staff attorneys to counsel clients accordingly. People
v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335 (Ct. App. 1987). The California Penal Code had placed a
similar duty on the trial court since 1978. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 2000). In 1981, a
Florida Appellate Court held that deportation is a consequence of such significance that
counsel's failure to advise of its potential rendered a guilty plea involuntary. Edwards v.
State, 393 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. den., 402 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1981).
Although the holding was subsequently called into doubt, Florida recognized the impor-
tance of advising aliens of potential deportation long before IIRIRA. The Florida Bar also
encouraged attorneys to educate themselves and their client about immigration repercus-
sions arising out of convictions. Alfred Zucaro, Jr. & Beth L. Mitchell, Criminal Convictions:
The Immigration Consequences, 63 FLA. B.J. 36, 36 (May 1989) (advising criminal defense at-
torneys that it is their duty to advise clients of immigration consequences). The New York
Legal Aid Society trained attorneys to counsel clients regarding potential impact of deporta-
tion and exclusion long before enactment of IIRIRA.
224. See supra note 223.
225. Between 1988 and 2001, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma and South
Dakota saw dramatic increases in the annual number of immigrants entering the country for
the purpose of living in those states. During this time, Kansas' number of immigrants admit-
ted annually increased from 2,130 to 4,030. Nebraska's number of admitted immigrants
increased from 837 during 1988 to 3,850 during 2001. Iowa experienced an increase in
annual numbers from 1,697 to 5,029 for these years. Missouri's number of annually admit-
ted immigrants increased from 3,082 to 7,616. Oklahoma experienced an increase from
2,050 to 3,492 annual admittees. South Dakota saw an increase from 254 to 671. U.S. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., STAT. Y.B. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 2001, 68
tbl.17 (2003), available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/
yearbook.pdf. The number of non-immigrant aliens, who are often students or temporary
workers, increased significantly. Measuring over a shorter period of time, from fiscal year
1996 to fiscal year 2000, these numbers reflect a significant growth in the non-citizen popu-
lations of these states. In 1996, 34,293 non-immigrant aliens arrived in Kansas. In 2000,
Kansas received 53,046 non-immigrant aliens. In 1996, 16,286 non-immigrant aliens arrived
in Nebraska. For 2000, that number was 23,526. Iowa had 31,351 non-immigrant aliens ar-
rive in 1996. In 2000, Iowa received 41,222 new non-immigrant aliens. Missouri saw an
increase from 66,340 new non-immigrant aliens living within its borders in 1996 to 91,894 in
2000. Oklahoma experienced an increase from 40,354 in 1996 to 57,170 new non-immigrant
aliens in 2000. South Dakota had 6,531 non-immigrant aliens arrive in fiscal year 1996. That
number increased to 8,831 in 2000. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., STAT. Y.B.
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996, 134 tbl.43 (1997); U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Serv., STAT. Y.B. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 2000, 174 tbl.41 (2002), available
at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/yearbook2000.pdf.
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any population experiences an increase in size, it will also
increasingly have its members encounter the criminal justice
system. Consequently, while attorneys in locations such as the
Plains States might rarely if ever have encountered non-citizen
clients decades ago, due to increased non-citizen populations,
there is now an increased likelihood that they will find themselves
representing aliens charged with crimes. However, without a
history of attorneys representing non-citizen clients in some of
these jurisdictions, standard practices have not developed
requiring attorneys to advise their clients of potential immigration
pitfalls.
2 6
To address this lack of uniform standards of practice regarding
the role of the attorney counseling non-citizen clients, two steps
should be taken. First, bar associations for federal and state practi-
tioners should establish clear, universal standards requiring that all
defense attorneys determine the citizenship of all clients and in-
form non-citizens of potential immigration consequences. If the
attorney is not aware of those consequences, she should engage in
"necessary study" or associate with a "lawyer of established compe-
tence in the field.,2 2' 7 Next, courts need to recognize that failure to
conform to this practice is unreasonable "under prevailing profes-
sional norms."228 Such a failure should provide sufficient evidence
to establish the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 29 Upon a defendant's showing that she would
have pled differently if counseled according to these proposed
standards,2 s° the defendant should be granted relief from her plea
of guilty or no contest.
226. E.g., State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002); Choudhary v. State, No. 99-509,
2000 WL 702382, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 31, 2000) (holding that immigration problems
are purely collateral to a guilty plea and that failure of an attorney to advise on this issue
does not give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); State v. Ramirez, 636 N.W.2d
740 (Iowa 2001) (holding that attorney for legal permanent resident had no duty to inform
of deportation consequences of a guilty plea); State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Neb.
2002) (stating that lawyer's failure to advise of immigration consequences of a plea does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in that the standard to be used is whether counsel
failed to perform "as well as a criminal lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the area.");
Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding, in a habeus corpus case, that a
defendant need not be advised of deportation consequences of a guilty plea, where the
relevant standard was whether counsel's advice "was within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases," (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985))).
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (1999).
228. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Legislative action at the federal and state level is also necessary.
Congress should modify Rule 11 to parallel the provisions of
California Penal Code § 1016.5291 and Massachusetts General Law
chapter 278 § 29D. This will require the court to provide a
uniform admonition about potential immigration consequences to
all defendants who appear to enter a plea.23 ' Failure to place the
admonition on the record will raise a presumption that the
admonition was not given by the court. If a defendant who entered
the plea without benefit of the admonition shows that adverse
immigration consequences may result, the defendant should be
permitted to withdraw her plea. Moreover, state legislatures that
have not yet implemented such laws should do so in a manner that
creates a uniform standard nationwide.
CONCLUSION
Under the INA of 1996, non-citizens convicted of even minor
criminal offenses can face dire consequences, often far worse than
the statutory sentence for the crime. All too often, criminal
defendants who are not from the United States waive their rights to
a trial without knowing that an apparently attractive plea can result
in deportation and exclusion from this country. Courts throughout
the nation address this issue in a variety of ways. Most do not let
defendants who are unaware of deportation consequences
withdraw their pleas based on that reason. The overriding
rationale is that deportation is a collateral consequence, of which
the defendant is not required to be informed. However,
deportation is unlike other collateral consequences in its severity
and certainty. If courts are unwilling to view deportation as a direct
consequence, then they should recognize it as a unique type of
consequence, different from all other so-called collateral
consequences. Moreover, courts should recognize that due to the
severity and certainty of deportation, due process requires that
defendants facing the possibility of immigration sanctions
stemming from a plea must be advised of that possibility before
they enter that plea and give up their right to trial.
231. See supra at pp. 729-30.
232. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
233. A provision similar to the Minnesota statute requiring an attorney to provide ad-
vice of immigration consequences is also desirable. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.01 (West Supp.
2003). However, inclusion of such a provision would be redundant if courts universally rec-
ognized that an attorney's failure to advise constitutes ineffective assistance.
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In addition to this judicial action, bar associations throughout
the country should develop universal standards requiring attorneys
to determine the immigration status of all clients and to properly
advise non-citizen clients of deportation risks of convictions. Fail-
ure to comply with these minimum standards should form the basis
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Finally, legislatures,
including Congress, should amend criminal procedure rules to
require that all criminal defendants be advised that if they are not
United States citizens, entering a plea of guilty or no contest to
crimes may adversely impact their immigration status.
Giving up one's right to a trial is a significant waiver of a consti-
tutional right. It should be done only when an individual is aware
of the serious consequences that may flow from it. Practices of at-
torneys and the courts must ensure that the accused do not waive
this important right, without first knowing that doing so can sepa-
rate them from their families and the country they know of as
home.

